The test for patentable subject matter under Section 101 lies at the heart of patent system. However, very little guidance is provided in the actual statutory language. It comes as no surprise that the “seemingly’ simple provision of patent eligible subject matter has caused a great deal of confusion among inventors, patent attorneys, district court judges, and even the Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court.

Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

Continue Reading USPTO Director Proposes New Patent Eligibility Guidance

The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) has renewed the hopes of applicants looking to patent method of treatment claims. A recent memo from the USPTO (the “Memo”) provides guidance on method of treatment claims, suggesting that when correctly drafted, such claims should generally be considered patent eligible subject matter.

The Memo comes in direct response to the Federal Circuit’s decision in Vanda v. West-Ward, issued on April 13, 2018. In Vanda, the Court, inter alia, distinguished certain method of treatment claims as patent eligible from those deemed ineligible by the Supreme Court in the infamous Mayo decision in 2012. The Court in Vanda found that the method of treatment claims at issue passed the first prong of the Mayo test, i.e., they were not directed to patent ineligible subject matter, and thus the claims did not need to be analyzed for an inventive concept under the second prong. To support its decision, the Vanda panel highlighted the specificity of the claims at issue:

At bottom, the claims here are directed to a specific method of treatment for specific patients using a specific compound at specific doses to achieve a specific outcome. They are different from Mayo. They recite more than the natural relationship between CYP2D6 metabolizer genotype and the risk of QTc prolongation. Instead, they recite a method of treating patients based on this relationship that makes iloperidone safer by lowering the risk of QTc prolongation. Accordingly, the claims are patent eligible.

For the reader’s convenience, an illustration from the USPTO on the Mayo test is reproduced to the left and a side-by-side comparison of the claim terms in Vanda and Mayo is set forth in the table below.

In analyzing the Vanda decision, the memo highlights three points:

  • First, claims should be evaluated as a whole. Thus, a claim should not be deemed patent ineligible simply because a claim requires a conventional step.
  • Second, patent eligible claims apply a natural relationship rather than claim such a relationship. For example, the claims in Mayo were deemed to be “directed to” the natural relationships of how the body interacts with certain drugs – “[a] method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy” – while the claims in Vanda apply a natural relationship through specific actions to treat a specific disease – “[a] method for treating a patient with iloperidone, [for treating] schizophrenia” and lowering adverse risks of such treatment.
  • Third, if a method of treatment claim is patent eligible under the first prong, of the Mayo test, the Court should not further proceed to the second prong of the Mayo test, i.e., analyzing the claims for something “more,” also known as the illusive “inventive concept.”.

With respect to the second point above, the Memo further explained that correctly drafted claims claim the application of a natural relationship rather than being directed to The Memo highlighted the order of the “primary steps” of “determining” the natural relationship then “administering” a specific quantity to “treat a particular disease.” A rule of thumb thus could be whether the following can be stated after reading a method of treatment claim: “The claim is directed to a method of using _______ [drug] to treat _______ [condition] comprising the following steps . . .”

The claims in Mayo, however, administered a drug and then analyzed the body’s natural reaction in order to provide advice on whether to increase or decrease dosage. In contrast, the claims in Vanda first determined the body’s natural reaction to a drug, then administered the drug in a specific dosage range to treat a particular disease.

While the Memo and the Vanda case signal good news for patentees, there is still a chance, as there always is with the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court, that future decision may change these interpretations yet again. The Vanda decision was not unanimous. Chief Judge Prost of the Federal Circuit dissenting in Vanda believes that the claims were merely “drafting efforts designed to monopolize the law of nature itself.” According to Chief Judge Prost, “[t]he fact that a reduction of iloperidone dosage in poor metabolizers to the [sic] may reduce QTc prolongation is both the means and the ends of this claim..” A petition for rehearing en banc is currently pending before the Federal Circuit; a Supreme Court petition will likely follow.

Mayo: US Patent 6,355,623
Vanda: US Patent 8,586,610
1. A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising:

(a) administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and

(b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder,

wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8×108 red blood cells indicates a need to increase the amount of said drug subsequently administered to said subject and

wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8×108 red blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug subsequently administered to said subject.

1. A method for treating a patient with iloperidone, wherein the patient is suffering from schizophrenia, the method comprising the steps of:

determining whether the patient is a CYP2D6 poor metabolizer by:

obtaining or having obtained a biological sample from the patient;

and

performing or having performed a genotyping assay on the biological sample to determine if the patient has a CYP2D6 poor metabolizer genotype; and

if the patient has a CYP2D6 poor metabolizer genotype, then internally administering iloperidone to the patient in an amount of 12 mg/day or less, and

if the patient does not have a CYP2D6 poor metabolizer genotype, then internally administering iloperidone to the patient in an amount that is greater than 12 mg/day, up to 24 mg/day,

wherein a risk of QTc prolongation for a patient having a CYP2D6 poor metabolizer genotype is lower following the internal administration of 12 mg/day or less than it would be if the iloperidone were administered in an amount of greater than 12 mg/day, up to 24 mg/day.

As a special feature of our blog, we include special guest postings by experts, clients, and other professionals—please enjoy this blog entry which includes guest author Rolf J. Haag.[1]

It has been impossible to miss the surreal volatility in Bitcoin’s per unit price—having gone from $1,000 in January 2017 to almost $20,000 (~$750B mkt. cap) toward the end of last year and retracting to under $8,000 (~$500B mkt. cap) in February 2018. Whether these G-LOC-inducing price undulations are reflective of a radical paradigm shift in the mode of financial transactions, history’s greatest pyramid scheme, or some mix thereof, remains to be seen. Continue Reading Will Blockchain Revolutionize Bio/Pharma R&D, Tech Transfer, and IP?

The Federal Circuit on Wednesday reversed Court precedent and long held belief that inter partes review (“IPR”) institution decisions were categorically non-reviewable. The Court, sitting en banc, held that the issue of whether a petitioner is time-barred from filing an IPR petition  under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) is in fact reviewable.[i]

This case arose when the patent owner alleged that an IPR petition was time barred based on the petitioner being privy with parties sued over the patent more than a year before the petition was filed. The IPR was instituted and a final written decision was published.

Congress granted the Director of the USPTO, subject to certain requirements, the sole discretion in whether to institute an IPR.  It is the extent of that discretion that the Court clarified on Wednesday. The Court honed in on two sections of the AIA—§§ 314 and 315. Section 314(a) authorizes the Director to institute an IPR if there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one claim challenged in the petition. Section 315(b) on the other hand is a statutory time bar provision that limits a petitioner’s ability to successfully pursue an IPR proceeding if the “petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner” was served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent more than one year before the IPR petition was filed. The question answered by the court was whether § 314(d), which deems the Director’s decision to institute an IPR “under this section” final an nonappelable, extends to the time bar set out in § 315(b). According to the court, § 314(d) does not extend to § 315(b), but it is unclear if other determinations may soon be reviewable.

In concluding that the time bar determination is appealable, the Court highlighted the “fundamentally different” analysis of § 314 and § 315. On one hand, § 314(a) relates to a substantive analysis of the merits—a “preliminary patentability determination.” On the other hand, § 315(b) is a “condition precedent to the Director’s authority to act.” In other words, § 315(b) is precondition that if met grants the Director the authority to make a determination under § 314(a). According to the Court, the lack of a clear indication that Congress intended to bar appeals related to § 315(b) gave way to “the strong presumption in favor of judicial review of agency actions.”

This decision, although limited to time bar appeals, opens the door for other challenges to the Director’s “sole discretion.” Based on the Court’s heavy reliance on the language of § 314 being directed to preliminary patentability determinations, it is possible that the Court may be amenable to further appeals that do not relate directly to the “patentability merits of the claims.” Other AIA threshold requirements that may be challenged include the requirement that petitioner name all interested parties in the case and the AIA estoppel provisions.


[i] The case is Wi-Fi One LLC v. Broadcom Corp., Nos. 15-1944, 15-1945, and 15-1946 (Fed. Cir. Decided January 8, 2018).

The Federal Circuit’s Review of Bayer’s Erectile Dysfunction Treatment Suggests Tolerance for a Wide Girth When Aiming for a Narrow Point

In Bayer Pharma AG v. Watson Laboratories, Inc. (Fed. Cir. November 1, 2017), the Federal Circuit overturned the District of Delaware’s finding that Watson failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the subject matter encompassed by the claims of Bayer’s U.S. Patent 8,613,950 (the ‘950 patent) was obvious under 35 USC 103. The CAFC invalidated claims 9 and 11 of the ’950 patent as unpatentably obvious. The Federal Circuit made this determination de novo based on the underlying findings of fact from the district court. Continue Reading When Are Swashbuckling Experts Seemingly ‘Flooding’ a Court with Large Number of References?